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This paper examines the role of public education in the context of parental migration, and it 
studies the effects of an expansive income tax policy that is adopted to increase public 
education expenditure per pupil. It is shown that such a policy may exacerbate income 
inequality in the long run if for the less skilled dynasties, the benefits of more public spending 
on education does not make up for the negative effects of increased parental absences. 
However, if the migration-induced tax base erosion is not severe, an expansive income tax 
policy indeed enhances future human capital for all dynasties, and moreover, it may help the 
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 1 Introduction
Most international migrants from East and South-East Asia go to countries that
want temporary workers rather than settlers, so most migrants leave their chil-
dren behind. ... If correct, a gure of 2 million [overseas Filipino workers] implies
that around 5 per cent of Filipino children had one or two parents overseas in
2000.
{ Situation Report on International Migration in East and South-East Asia
(2008), International Organization for Migration
The continuous rise in the global amount of remittances has triggered heated debates over
their economic impacts on the recipient side.1 Indeed, the money sent home by adults work-
ing abroad can be of important help to nance education of the young generation (Kandel
and Kao 2001; Cox Edwards and Ureta 2003; Hanson and Woodru 2003; McKenzie and
Rapoport 2006). On the one hand, remittances may boost household income and increase
private educational investments. On the other hand, households that are previously liquid-
ity constrained may become able to aord the x costs of sending children to school (e.g.,
tuition fees and material expenses). At the same time, however, it is widely acknowledged
that parents play an indispensable role in children's human capital formation.2 Despite the
potential benets of remittances entailed by parental migration, empirical studies have sug-
gested that parental absences may imply more housework for the children left behind and
that lack of eective supervision may cause these children to develop behavioral problems,
all of which adversely aects their school attendance and performances.
Hence, the overall impact of parental migration is rather obscure on children's human capital
1See Rapoport and Docquier (2006) for the survey of related literature.
2For example, using the U.S. Army personnel data, Lyle (2006) nds that parental absences due to
military deployment have a negative impact on children's test scores.
1accumulation, which is however an extremely important determinant of economic growth.3
Moreover, it is considered in the related literature that human capital investment through
formal schooling is crucial in generating positive growth eects (Glomm and Ravikumar
1992; Glomm and Ravikumar 2001). At the same time, public schools are the main vehicle
to achieve universal primary education, one of the Millennium Development Goals set out by
the United Nations to eradicate poverty. Additionally, public resources may also be spent
through schools in order to prevent children of migrants from dropping out due to weak
parental control.4 Last but not least, public education can be used as the second-best policy
to correct the negative externality caused by decentralized educational decisions made by
parents (Eckstein and Zilcha 1994). While taxation is necessary to nance public education
expenditures, the departure of working-age adults may however undermine the domestic tax
base.
This paper sets out, in the context of parental migration, a theoretical model where economic
growth is human capital driven. Human capital formation requires three inputs, including
parental transmission of human capital, private educational investment, as well as public
education expenditure per pupil. The government has one policy tool: it chooses the income
tax rate in order to adjust the amount of public spending.5 The aim of the paper is then
to study how an expansive income tax policy, via its direct impacts on public education
expenditures and indirect eects on household decisions, may aect economic growth and
income inequality in the long run.
3See the pioneering works of Romer (1986) and Lucas (1988). Krueger and Lindahl (2001) provides a
comprehensive review of the related literature.
4Several policy reports observe that parental absences are often accompanied by children's increased
absences in school or dropping out. See, for example, Education for some more than others? A regional
study on education in Central and Eastern Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent States (2007),
prepared by the UNICEF regional oce for CEE/CIS.
5In many developing countries, government revenue relies much more heavily on consumption tax than
on personal income tax (see, for example, Table 1 in Gordon and Li (2009)). This paper focuses on personal
income tax as it directly inuences the incentive to work abroad for temporary migrants. In Footnote 11,
we will briey discuss the implications of consumption tax in our baseline model.
2The trade-o between higher earnings abroad and parental absences are an especially mean-
ingful issue for temporary migration. Temporary migrants tend to be young adults, located
in the age group that is most likely to have early school-age children. For instance, as one of
the world's largest guest worker sending countries, the Philippines have more than 50% of
their overseas workers below 35 years old in 2006 and 2007, with one quarter of the total be-
ing those aged between 25 and 29.6 Moreover, several studies hint that temporary migrants
seem to be more likely to remit (Merkle and Zimmerman 1992; Glytsos 1997; Duraisamy
and Narasimhan 2000). Research on remittances decay also shows that the amount of re-
mittances decline more mildly over time for migrants with strong attachments to the origin
(Funkhouser 1995; Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo 2006).
On top of the pros and cons at the household level, parental migration may also generate
externalities on other children's schooling through public education. First, the diculty to
tax foreign income may thwart the use of income tax policy to raise public spending on
education, as Maimbo and Ratha (2005) put it: \Eorts to tax remittances or direct them
to specic investments are likely to prove ineective" since migrants may simply resort to
unocial channels to remit. Hence, due to the possibility of migration, tax base erosion is
inevitable. Moreover, data on international migration reveals a strong pattern of positive
self-selection into migration (see Figure 1). It suggests that better skilled individuals are
more likely to emigrate, which consequently shifts the tax burden toward the less skilled
families. At the end, the direction of income redistribution through public education is a
priori unclear.
Positive self-selection into migration also implies that the better skilled benets more from
foreign earnings than their less skilled counterparts, which will eventually result in a larger
gap in private educational investments for their ospring. This, combined with the negative
externality of tax base erosion, may generate serious implications on economic growth and
6See the Survey on Overseas Filipinos released by the Filipino National Statistics Oce.
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income inequality in the long run. Hence, the government may invoke an expansive income
tax policy in the hope of achieving a growth-enhancing and inequality-reducing outcome.
However, as an increased tax rate indicates a decline in the net domestic income, an expansive
income tax policy gives rise to a stronger incentive to migrate and may further erode the
tax base. This complexity is fully analyzed in the paper.
Our work contributes to two streams of literature. In the literature on growth and inequality,
Glomm and Ravikumar (1992) and Galor and Tsiddon (1997) both suggest that adopting
a redistributive policy in the short-run may hinder economic performances in the long run.
However, in the context of parental migration, our paper shows that an expansive income
tax policy, by increasing public provision of education, enhances future human capital for
all dynasties if it does provoke serious tax base erosion due to a larger ow of out-migration
in response to heavier taxation (i.e., with a suciently high tax rate elasticity of public ed-
ucation expenditure per pupil); moreover, such a policy may help the less skilled households
4escape from the poverty trap, thus reducing long-run income inequality. In this respect, our
ndings echo the results in Saint-Paul and Verdier (1993) and Eckstein and Zilcha (1994)
who study the role of public intervention in education. Nonetheless, our paper is novel in
showing that an expansive income tax policy may exacerbate income inequality in the long
run because, for the less skilled dynasties, the benets of more public spending on education
does not make up for the negative eects of increased parental absences.7 This is in line
with the nding that personal income tax is ineective in terms of reducing inequality in
developing countries (Bird and Zolt 2005), and our paper provides an alternative explanation
particularly for the labor sending countries.
Our work also supplements the literature on brain drain and economic growth. Haque
and Kim (1995) argue that, in an open economy, subsidizing education induces brain drain
by imposing heavier taxation, and as emigrants do not repay the subsidies in the form
of future taxes, public intervention in education does not contribute to economic growth
at origin. In this paper, however, public education provides resources to children from
dierent families alike. Moreover, while migrants are positively self-selected and more would
migrate following an expansive income tax policy to increase the funding for public education,
they may still indirectly contribute to the future tax base by privately investing more in
their children's education. This feedback eect is particularly important when it comes to
temporary parental migration.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the theoretical model. Sec-
tion 3 begins with analyzing the evolution of human capital distribution, then it scrutinizes
the impacts of an expansive income tax policy. Finally, Section 4 concludes.
7In comparison, Glomm and Ravikumar (2003) demonstrate, in a dierent framework and in a closed
economy, that the relationship between the tax rate (used to fund public education) and income inequality is
U-shaped over time. In Blankenau and Simpson (2004), it is shown that public education expenditures may
crowd out other relevant factors for economic growth, thus producing an overall negative growth impact.
In a certain sense, via the income tax policy, public education can be considered to crowd out parental
transmission of human capital in our model.
52 A Baseline Model
We model an overlapping generations economy inhabited by two-period living individuals,
who belong to an innite number of heterogeneous dynasties indexed by i 2 [0;1). For a
dynasty i at period t, the household is composed of parents and children, both of mass 1.8
The heterogeneity across dynasties lies in the parental human capital hi
t, which is distributed
on a non-negative support. Let us denote g(hi
t) as the density function, with the initial human
capital hi










t  0; (1)
with N denoting the total size of the population.
Individuals spend their entire childhood going to school at origin. They turn into adults and
have children as soon as the second period begins. Parental human capital hi
t is determined
by education received in the previous period, and by assumption, it perfectly transforms
into the eciency units of labor possessed by each adult belonging to dynasty i at period t.
During adulthood, individuals inelastically supply labor and work either at origin or abroad.
At origin, a composite good is produced uniquely with total eciency units of labor supplied
by resident adults:













t 2 [0;1]; (2)
where ! > 0 denotes the exogenous technology parameter, which can be seen as an indicator
of the level of development at origin, and mi
t can be regarded as the fraction of household
adults who migrate to work abroad, or as the fraction of total adult time spent abroad, at
period t.9 In other words, Ht is the total human capital remaining in the sending country.
8The fertility rate is assumed to be one, 8i; t, so that economic growth in our model originates only from
human capital accumulation.
9Although our model ts better temporary migration, we assume only one period of adult life and omit
6The domestic wage rate per unit of human capital equates its marginal productivity !, which
is assumed to be strictly lower than the foreign wage rate  w, i.e., ! <  w.
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1  ; 0 < ;  < 1; ( + ) < 1 (5)
The household utility function (3) is charaterized by \warm glow," where  is the altruistic
parameter that shows how much parents care about their children's expected future earning
potential h
i;e
t+1 relative to household consumption ci
t. The latter is required by the household
budget balance (4) to equate net household income, whether earned domestically or abroad,
less private educational investment bi
t and total migration costs, with  denoting costs per
migrant.10 Note that the government is able to levy tax only on domestic income.11 Thus,
remittances are implicitly assumed to be non-taxable.
the costs of return migration. However, we could consider the model being characterized by costless return
migration or that the gross migration costs consist of the total expenses incurred by outgoing and return
migrations. Moreover, in view of temporary migration, the concept of household is better suited for a
migrant's extended family. Several policy reports identify the role of extended family members in (partially)
assuming the responsibility of child-rearing during migrant parents' absences.
10It is assumed that migration costs can be nanced at a zero interest rate from foreign sources, e.g.
foreign recruitment agencies. This assumption is made because we are not interested in credit constraints
that may prevent the poorer households from emigrating, and it also exempts us from modeling a domestic
credit market. The assumption of zero interest rate could be easily relaxed, so that households below a
certain threshold of human capital face higher gross migration costs, i.e.  plus interests. It will be observed
later that this relaxation only reinforces positive self-selection that already exists in our current setting.
11Alternatively, we can also include a consumption tax c such that Eq. (4) becomes (1 + c)ci
t = 






t    mi
t. However, c does not change the optimal solutions for bi
t and mi
t
in the log-linear utility setting. Therefore, the eect of raising c is straightforward: it increases tax revenue,
raises public education funding per pupil, and helps to reduce economic disparity.
7Parents' expectation about their children's future earning potential (h
i;e
t+1) is derived from
the human capital formation process specied above. It takes place in childhood, and Eq.
(5) captures all eects of parental migration described in Section 1. The rst term (1 mi
t)hi
t
measures parental transmission of human capital, positively depending on the size of non-
migrant parents. By the same token, it captures the negative eect of parental absences due
to migration. In addition, children's future human capital is increasing in the amount of
private educational investment, as well as in the tax-nanced public education expenditure
per pupil, denoted by t.
Parents make the optimal decisions (denoted by ) at the beginning of each period. We
focus on the interior solution. It can be easily seen that bi
t
 > 0 and mi
t
 < 1 due to the
log-linear specication for the household utility function (3). Lemma 1 below shows that
mi
t
 > 0 when the following assumptions hold.
Assumption 1 Every child is born with a unit of basic human capital. Human capital





















Assumption 2 Migration costs are suciently low relative to the foreign wage such that
 <  w  
1 + ( + )
1 + 
 !:
Lemma 1 As long as Assumptions 1 and 2 hold, every household has some but not all adults
working abroad, i.e., 0 < mi
t
 < 1.
Proof: See Appendix A. 
The interior solution to the household maximization problem is unique and the optimal
8values for mi
t and bi





























It is straightforward to verify that the optimal migration rate increases with the level of
human capital (i.e., @ mi
t
=@ hi
t > 0). The reason is that, for a better-skilled adult, migration
costs  are relatively cheaper when compared to the pecuniary benet of migration, i.e., the
international dierence of net earnings:
 
 w   (1   )!

hi
t. Hence, a positive self-selection
pattern emerges that is consistent with the stylized fact. This also provides the rationale
behind Lemma 1: when the migration costs are suciently low such that the lowest-skilled
household has some family members working abroad, then so do all other households.
Furthermore, the optimal migration rate is increasing also with the tax rate (i.e., @ mi
t
=@  >
0). Thus, when the government attempts at period t to increase public educational spending
by augmenting the tax rate, the concurrent tax base (i.e., total domestic wage income !Ht)
may erode further with more adults working abroad. If the tax base shrinks signicantly,
the government budget for public education may actually decline, as opposed to the initial
intention.
3 Evolution of Human Capital Distribution
This section begins by studying the evolution of human capital and its long-run distribution.
Then, in the remaining, we scrutinize the eects of an expansive income tax policy. First,
we study whether such a policy can indeed boost public education expenditure per pupil
and whether it acts to redistribute income from the rich to the poor. In what follows, we
analyze how a marginal increase in the tax rate may aect the evolution of human capital
9and its implications on long-term income distribution.




 into the human capital formation equation (5).



























Lemma 2 Under Assumptions 1 and 2, children's human capital (hi
t+1) is non-decreasing
in parental human capital (hi
t) if
   w 
2( + )(1   !
 w)
(2 + ) +
p
2 + 4( + )!
 w
; (8)
or migration costs () are low enough relative to the foreign wage (  w). The sucient con-
dition may or may not be satised by Assumption 2. However, both Inequality (8) and
Assumption 2 are more likely to be satised with a larger international dierence in gross
wages (  w   !).
Proof: See Appendix B. 
As we are interested in South-North migration, where international wage dierences are
undoubtedly sizable, we disregard the empirically irrelevant case: (@ hi
t+1=@ hi
t)  0, by
rening the assumption on migration costs as below:












2( + )(1   !
 w)
(2 + ) +
p
2 + 4( + )!
 w
!)
After a careful examination of Eq. (5'), we can analyze the long-term behavior of human
capital:
Proposition 1 Given Assumptions 1 and 3, the distribution of human capital fhi
tg, i 2
[0;1) has at least one locally stable steady state:  hi  1 for any initial condition fhi
0g,
i 2 [0;1). In the case when there exist more than one locally stable steady state, depending
on the initial distribution of human capital, a poverty trap may appear which prevents low-
skilled dynasties to reach the locally stable steady state with a higher level of human capital.
Proof: See Appendix C. 
We prove in Appendix C that the number of locally stable steady states is one, two, or three
(see Figure C.1 for an illustration). Depending on the initial distribution of human capital
and the parameter set, some dynasties may fall into a poverty trap, which is dened as \any
self-reinforcing mechanism which causes poverty to persist"(Azariadis and Stachurski 2005).
Obviously, a poverty trap is more likely to occur with a atter distribution of initial human
capital. In this case, unless there exists some kind of redistributive mechanism, knowledge
or technical spill-overs from the rich to the poor, those individuals at the lowest end of
distribution will be trapped at a low level of human capital.
In our model, a dynasty's current human capital depends on its initial value and the dynastic
history, and as in Glomm and Ravikumar (2003), public education is the only channel for
the poor dynasties to escape from a poverty trap. Note in the literature that the aggregated
level of human capital produces positive externality and aects individual human capital
11formation in a monotonic fashion (for example, see Galor and Tsiddon (1997)).12 In the
present model, however, it is the remaining human capital (Ht) that matters because public
education is nanced by domestic income. Since migration gives rise to the problem of tax
base erosion, a high level of aggregated human capital does not necessarily imply a high
remaining level. Furthermore, the size of the externality is determined by the tax rate as
public education is tax-nanced.
In an economy with highly heterogeneous human capital and where the poor dynasties are
haunted by the possibility of a poverty trap, the policy maker can resort to an expansive
income tax policy in order to increase the public input (t) in the human capital formation
process. Despite the threat of tax base erosion that might scrape government revenue, the
following proposition shows that an expansive income tax policy always increases public
education expenditure per pupil under the model assumptions.
Proposition 2 Under Assumptions 1 and 2, the level of public education expenditure per
pupil is strictly increasing and strictly concave in the tax rate, i.e. @ t
@  > 0 and @2 t
@ 2 < 0. In
other words, the tax rate elasticity of public education expenditure per pupil ( 
t
@ t
@  ) is higher
at a lower tax rate.
Proof: See Appendix D. 
The non-linear structure of the elasticity in Proposition 2 comes from the possibility to
migrate, which produces the second-order eect of tax base erosion. It negatively aects
the government budget to provide public education and renders the income tax policy less
eective. In an open economy as specied in this paper, the positively selective pattern of
12In Galor and Tsiddon (1997) inequality may be a growth engine for the entire economy. In their model,
an individual's human capital depends upon the aggregated human capital. Consequently, if there exists a
leading group with very high human capital, it can become high enough to pull upwards the entire economy.
Notice that a temporal poverty trap may have been created and/or exacerbated in the medium term, but it
is important for the long-term not to slow down the leaders (by means of increasing taxes for instance).
12out-migration indicates that the dynasties with higher human capital have a larger share
of total income coming from the non-taxable foreign source. Consequently, the direction of
redistribution is a priori unclear.
Lemma 3 A household's tax contribution is non-monotonic in the level of human capital:
If 1  hi






















Proof: See Appendix E. 
Hence, if the human capital distribution is such that there exist some households with
very low human capital, it is not necessarily the poorest households but those with hi
t
around the neighborhood of (1 +
p
(1   )!=  w)=( w   (1   )!) who receive the largest
net redistribution through public education. Hence, if there are insucient number of highly
skilled households, the poorest households may actually serve as the main contributors to
the nancing of public education. Nevertheless, it is straightforward to see that the upper
bound of human capital in Condition (9) is decreasing in the tax rate. That is to say, the
issue of reverse redistribution can be alleviated by an expansive income tax policy, which
also acts to raise public education expenditure per pupil as shown in Proposition 2.
Next, we need to ask the question: does a marginal increase in the tax rate benet all
dynasties in terms of their future human capital? As a matter of fact, the next Proposition
warns that an expansive income tax policy does not necessarily promote a more equalized
income distribution. Instead, it can possibly lead to deepened inequality in the long-run.
Proposition 3 A marginal increase in the tax rate, via increased provision of public edu-
cation, improves (or does not deteriote) the future human capital for the dynasties whose
human capital is suciently high at the time of policy intervention such that hi
t >  ht, with








1      

! ht
( w   (1   )!) ht   
:
For dynasties with lower human capital hi
t   ht, however, the same policy deteriorates (or
does not improve) their future human capital. In short,
@hi
t+1
@  0 , hi
t >  ht ;
@hi
t+1
@  0 , hi
t   ht :
Proof: See Appendix F. 
In an economy with two stable steady states for example (see Figure C.1.b for an illustration),
if  ht is located in between, Proposition 3 implies that an expansive income tax policy may
push the two equilibrium levels of human capital further away from each other. Therefore,
those dynasties with hi
t >  ht become better o in the long-run, while others will be worse
o. In fact, there is a possibility that an expansive income tax policy may create perpetual
income inequality in an economy originally characterized by one stable steady state, or long-
run equality. Figure 2 illustrates such a case, where the curvature of hi
t+1(hi
t) changes for
intermediate levels of human capital due to a larger .
Corollary 1 If hi
t+1(hi
t) is originally concave in the neighborhood of hi
t, a marginal increase
in the tax rate may change the local curvature to convex. Ceteris paribus, this change is
more likely to occur with a larger public education expenditure per pupil.
Proof: See Appendix G. 
The cause behind the income polarization described in Proposition 3 is as follows. First,










Before the adoption of an
expansive income tax policy,
hi
t+1(hi
t) has one stable steady
state A. After the policy inter-
vention, households with hi
t 2
[1;B] converge to the stable
steady state A whereas those
with hi
t 2 (B;1] converge to
C which is also stable.
Figure 2: Perpetual inequality created by a shift of hi
t+1(hi
t) due to an expansive income tax
policy
public education expenditure per pupil, and private educational investment. Second, an
expansive income tax policy certainly increases public provision of education (t). Third,
notice that the optimal private educational investment (bi
t
) is not aected by the tax rate
nor by changes in public education. Hence, parental absence is the only channel that may
produce negative impact on human capital formation when the government marginally raises







1 + ( + )

! f[ w + (1   )!]hi
t   g
f[ w   (1   )!]hi
t   g
3 < 0:
That is, although the migration rate is increasing in human capital (i.e., positive self-
selection), a marginal increase in the tax rate augments the low-skilled parents' migration
rate faster. Thus, following an expansive income tax policy, the marginal rise in the costs
of parental absences is larger for the less skilled. In the meantime, the marginal increase
in the benets from elevated public education expenditure per pupil is lower for the less
skilled because public education is complimentary to the combination of other inputs for
human capital formation. As poorer parents have fewer of which, they benet less from the
15complementarity.
Other things being equal, Corollary 1 tells us that income polarization following an expansive
income tax policy is more likely to happen when the public education expenditure is large,
or when the tax rate is already high. If public education plays an important role for the
future generations' human capital, i.e., a large (1  ), the government then has a great
interest in setting a high tax rate. In this case, a progressive income tax scheme may help to
better avoid income polarization. With an ad valorem tax, however, the following Corollary
species a sucient condition under which an expansive income tax policy improves future
human capital for all dynasties, regardless the distribution of human capital at the time of
policy intervention.
Corollary 2 A marginal increase in the tax rate, via increased provision of public educa-
tion, improves the future human capital for all dynasties, if the tax rate elasticity of public








1      

!
[ w   (1   )!   ]
: (10)
The condition is more likely to be satised at a lower tax rate () and with lower migration
costs ().
Proof: See Appendix H. 
The intuition behind the corollary above is illustrated in Figure 3. Moreover, as shown in
the lower panel b., if originally the economy would have ended up with perpetual income
inequality (i.e., more than one locally stable steady states), then a large enough increase
in public education through an expansive income tax policy may help to create equality in
the long-run, when all dynasties experience growing human capital and the entire economy








a. The value of the unique
stable steady state for hi
t+1(hi
t)
grows larger from A to A,











b. Before the adoption of
an expansive income tax pol-
icy, hi
t+1(hi
t) has two locally
stable steady states A and
C. After the policy interven-
tion, there is only one sta-
ble steady state: C, whose
value is greater than the pre-
viously largest stable steady
state value.
Figure 3: Upward shift of hi
t+1(hi
t) trajectory following an expansive income tax policy
17human capital is consequently larger than the original largest steady state. This nding is in
contrast to Glomm and Ravikumar (1992) and Galor and Tsiddon (1997). Both suggest that
public intervention in the short-run (for equality purposes) could hinder long-run economic
performances. In this paper, while public education carries the role of eective income
redistribution, it is also an essential stimulus for human capital growth.
Finally, Corollary 2 suggests that, in order for an expansive income tax policy to achieve a
growth-enhancing and equality-promoting outcome, it should be adopted when the issues of
tax base erosion and of parental absences are still relatively minor (i.e., when the tax rate is
suciently low), in comparison to the benets of elevated public education expenditure per
pupil. Besides, such a policy is more likely to be successful when migration costs are lower.
It implies that the net gain from working abroad rises, and migration becomes more ecient
in terms of enlarging the household budget. As a result of increased private educational
investment, the complementary inputs of human capital formation (i.e., parental transmis-
sion and public provision of education) both grow more productive. As parents nd their
absences more costly, an expansive income tax policy is less likely to cause serious tax base
erosion, which in turn indicates a larger tax rate elasticity of public education expenditure
per pupil.
3.1 A note on the corner solution
We have just mentioned that, when migration costs () are lower, an expansive income
tax policy is more likely to achieve positive outcomes of economic growth and of income
inequality. But, what if migration costs are so high such that Assumption 2 does not
hold? Then, it is found that there exists a critical value of human capital: ^ h > 1, below
which households do not migrate at all.13 This is because, if migrating, they will have
13Notice that, although Assumption 2 is relaxed, the assumption  w  
 




 ! > 0
still maintains throughout the discussion of this section; otherwise, the foreign wage is too low for any
household to migrate. This is an easily satised assumption as the World Development Indicators show that
18such low levels of net foreign wage ( whi
t   ) that the benet of migration is not worth
of the costs caused by parental absences. Depending on the initial distribution of human
capital, income polarization may already occur at the very beginning of the migration history.
More specically, the non-migrating parents do not benet from the high foreign wage rate
whereas other dynasties enjoy enlarged household budgets, which enable them to make more
private investments in their children's education.14 In the long-run, the initial human capital
disparity will be reinforced unless there is sucient public intervention in education in order
to lift up the poor dynasties (i.e., through t).
Due to tractability issues, this paper has focused its dynamic analysis on the migrating
dynasties; however, it is worth investigating the determinants of the migration threshold ^ h,
which aects the number of households who do not migrate at each period.
Corollary 3 If Assumption 2 fails to hold, then given an initial distribution of human capital
fhi
0g; i 2 [0;1), the number of households who do not migrate at each period
i) increases with migration costs (), domestic wage (!) and the elasticity of human
capital to parental transmission ();
ii) decreases with tax rate (), foreign wage (  w), and the elasticity of human capital to
private educational investment ();
Proof: See Appendix I. 
The number of non-migrating households is inuenced by the monetary benets of migra-
tion: less households have adults working abroad when their disposable domestic income
the cross-country income dierences are huge. The ratio of average GNI per capita (adjusted by purchasing
power parity) is around 10 for high to lower middle income countries, and around 25 for high to low income
countries.
14\Children of migrants belong, on average, to wealthier households than children of non-migrants." ac-
counts the IOM report quoted in the introduction. Moreover, \Previous studies have shown that children
of migrants are more likely to attend expensive private schools than children of non-migrants, so children of
migrants receive higher quality education, on top of the higher quantity [:::]."
19((1   )!hi
t) is higher or when the net foreign income ( whi
t   ) is lower. Despite monetary
benets, however, parental migration bears the costs of reduced human capital transmission.
As  and  represent respectively the eciencies of parental transmission and of private ed-
ucational investment, a rise in the marginal benet of each input then produces contrasting
eects, with the former increases and the latter decreases the number of non-migrating
households.
Based on the observations above, the existence of the corner solution oers some interesting
dynamic conjectures. First, if there are multiple steady states, more dynasties may fall into
the low equilibrium with a higher , or a more important role of parental transmission of
human capital. In this case, even though the low-skilled dynasties do not migrate and suer
minimally from parental absences, they have very limited human capital to transmit to their
ospring. At the upper tail, however, higher levels of human capital coupled with elevated
private educational investments (aided by foreign income) have the potential to dynamically
enlarge the gap and separate two ends of the human capital distribution. Without a strong
enough public intervention in education, a perpetual income polarization will be created.
Second, although non-migrating households do not directly benet from the foreign wage,
their ospring may do so through the role of public education. This is because, if tax base
erosion is not severe, higher levels of private investment enabled by foreign income will help
to increase migrant children's future human capital; consequently, the aggregate human
capital in the following period also rises. Again, if tax base erosion is not severe such that
the remaining human capital is also higher, then the access to foreign wage will eventually
raise the funding for public education at origin and benet non-migrating families as well.
However, high migration costs will undermine this sort of trick-down mechanism as the net
foreign income declines.
204 Conclusion
This paper examines the role of public education in the context of parental migration, and
it studies the eects of an expansive income tax policy that is adopted to increase public
education expenditure per pupil. The novelty of our work lies in its demonstration that such
a policy may exacerbate income inequality in the long run if the income tax policy is not
suciently eective (i.e., without a suciently high tax rate elasticity of public education
expenditure per pupil). This is because, for the less skilled dynasties, the benets of more
public spending on education does not make up for the negative eects of increased parental
absences. However, if tax base erosion is not severe, an expansive income tax policy, via
increased provision of public education, indeed enhances future human capital for all dy-
nasties, and moreover, it may help the less skilled households escape from the poverty trap,
thus reducing long-run income inequality.
Furthermore, it is found that an expansive income tax policy is more likely to achieve the
growth-enhancing and inequality-reducing outcome when migration costs are lower, as mi-
gration is then more ecient in raising the household budget and the marginal costs of
parental absences also grow higher. Thus, public education spending enjoys the compli-
mentary of more private educational investments and more parental transmission of human
capital. This result calls for a better international coordination in regulating the industry of
guest worker recruitment agencies. More often than not, migrant workers need to subtract
a handsome amount from their paychecks in order to pay o the fees and other expenses
charged by these agencies.
In summary, migration is a knife with two edges. On the one hand, lest the government is
able to eciently levy taxes on foreign income, tax base erosion can weaken public provision
of education; moreover, a positively self-selective migration pattern shifts the tax burden
towards those who are less skilled. On the other hand, however, remittances that are invested
in children's education may produce positive externality in a dynamic perspective, as long
21as tax base erosion does not cancel out the benets. In real life, the development deadlock
is often formed and reinforced by the fact that too many of the migrant children grow up
more educated but still follow their parents' footsteps to work overseas.15
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Appendices
A Proof of Lemma 1
By rearranging mi
t
j=0 > 0, where mi
t










By Assumptions 1 and 2, mi
t
j=0 > 0 holds for every household i 2 [0;1). Then, it is easily
shown that @ mi
t
=@  > 0; 8 2 [0;1]. 
15See, for example, Lisa Wiltse's 2008 essay for the Time Magazine: \The Motherless Generation," where
she reports the intergenerational cycle of emigration in the Philippines.
22B Proof of Lemma 2


























t ; with hi
t  1: (B.1)
When (hi
t)  1, hi
t+1 is constant and therefore non-decreasing in hi
t. In order to derive the
condition under which hi
t+1(hi
t) is also non-decreasing when (hi
t) > 1, it is sucient to show that
0(hi
t)  0 8hi























t( + )  w










which is non-negative if and only if the last factor in the expression above is non-negative. After
some computations, it is found that, 8hi
t > 1
0(hi
t)  0 , hi
t   
(2 + ) +
p
2 + 4( + )(1   )w
 w




 w   (1   )!

:
A sucient condition for the inequalities to hold is
(hi
t >) 1 
 
 
(2 + ) +
p
2 + 4( + )(1   )w
 w




23After some rearrangements, we obtain Inequality (8) whose satisfaction in fact implies that, if
(hi
t) > 1, hi
t+1(hi

















which is however not necessarily true. Nevertheless, it can be easily veried that Inequality (8) and
Assumption 2 are more likely to be satised with a larger (  w   !).
C Proof of Proposition 1
Under Assumptions 1 and 3 and with (hi
















t) > 0 8hi
t > 1 ;
If (hi
t)  1; hi







We rstly compute the second derivative of (hi
t) for all hi














































t) is strictly concave when hi
t tends to innity. Next, let us consider P(hi
t); 8hi
t 2 R.
If all roots of P(hi
t) are complex with non-zero imaginary parts, then it implies 00(hi
t) is always
negative for all hi
t > 1, i.e., (hi
t) is globally concave and (hi









a. If all roots of P(hi
t) are complex, the number of
locally stable steady state for hi
t+1(hi
t) is at least
one: A (solid curve) or 1 (dash dotted curve), and












t) has two real roots for all hi
t > 1, the
number of locally stable steady state for hi
t+1(hi
t)
is at least one: A (solid curve) or 1 (dash dotted















t) has four real roots for all hi
t > 1, the
number of locally stable steady state for hi
t+1(hi
t)
is at least one: A (solid curve) or 1 (dash dot-
ted curve), and at most four: A0, B0, C0, and 1
(dashed curve).
Figure C.1: Steady State of hi
t+1(hi
t)
25(see Figure C.1.a). If (hi
t) crosses the 45 line at least once at (hi
t) > 1, then the number of
locally stable steady state for hi
t+1(hi
t) is at least one :  hi > 1 (two if 1 <  1(1), with the smaller
one being  hi = 1). Otherwise, there exists a unique stable steady state  h = 1.
If P(hi
t) has two complex roots with non-zero imaginary parts, then 00(hi
t) has at most two real
roots for all hi
t > 1 such that (hi
t) crosses the 45 line at most four times, with the rst and
third largest steady states being stable (see Figure C.1.b). Similar to the argument above, if (hi
t)
crosses the 45 line at least once at (hi
t) > 1, then the number of locally stable steady state for
hi
t+1(hi
t) is at least one :  hi > 1 (at most three if 1 <  1(1), with the smallest one being  hi = 1,
or else at most two). Otherwise, there exists a unique stable steady state  h = 1.
If all roots of P(hi
t) are real, 00(hi
t) has at most four real roots for all hi
t > 1 such that (hi
t)
crosses the 45 line at most six times, with the rst, third, and fth largest steady states being
stable (see Figure C.1.c). If (hi
t) crosses the 45 line at least once at (hi
t) > 1, then the number
of locally stable steady state for hi
t+1(hi
t) is at least one :  hi > 1 (at most four if 1 <  1(1), with
the smallest one being  hi = 1, or else at most three). Otherwise, there exists a unique stable steady
state  h = 1.

D Proof of Proposition 2
By taking the derivative of Eq. (3) with respect to , we decompose the eects of an marginal



















On the one hand, a marginal increase in the tax rate directly implies that the government extracts
a greater fraction of domestic income to nance public education expenditure per pupil (hence the
positive sign for the rst term). On the other hand, however, migration rates are increasing with
26the tax rate; therefore, there is less remaining human capital and tax base erosion deepens (hence
the negative sign for the second term). Below, we investigate which eect dominates by replacing
Eq. (2) into Eq. (D.1). Moreover, under Assumptions 1 and 2, we replace the migration rate by
































































E Proof of Lemma 3








t, where the optimal migration rate
is expressed in Eq. (6). Taking the derivative of the tax contribution with respect to human capital,

















 w   (1   )!
< hi





 w   (1   )!
Under Assumptions 1 and 2, the lower bound is always satised. 
27F Proof of Proposition 3
In order to study the sign of @ hi
t+1=@, we rstly compute the derivative of (hi
t) with respect to
, with (hi








































@  > 0 if and only if









(  w   (1   )!)hi
t   
: (F.1)
It suggests that, if the inequality above is satised, an increase in tax from  to 0 leads to
(@ hi
t+1=@) > 0 unless 1  hi
t   1(1)j0, for which range (@ hi
t+1=@ ) = 0. Let us dene  ht
such that the right and left hand sides of Inequality (F.1) equalize. As the right hand side is
strictly decreasing in hi
t, we obtain the proposition. 
G Proof of Corollary 1
Since we focus on the neighborhood of hi
t where the curve is originally concave, we need to study
the values of hi
t such that hi
t+1 = (hi
































t) < 0. Eq. (G.1) tells us how a marginal increase in  changes the curvature around hi
t.
Given an originally concave curve in the neighborhood of hi
t, the second derivative and P(hi
t) are
28both negative. If












such that the rst factor in Eq. (G.1) is negative, then it implies that the second order derivative
of hi
t+1(hi
t) increases with . Hence, hi
t+1(hi
t) may turn from concave to convex with a suciently
large , and the distribution of human capital may exhibit multiplicity of steady states. 
H Proof of Corollary 2
By Proposition 3 and Assumption 1, a sucient condition for
@hi
t+1








(1      )

!
[  w   (1   )!   ]
:
The left hand side of the inequality (i.e., the tax rate elasticity of public education expenditure
per pupil) is decreasing in , as shown in Proposition 2, whereas the right hand side can be easily
proven to be increasing in  and .





 w   (1 +

1+)  (1   )!
The corollary is proved by taking the partial derivatives of ^ h with respect to each of the model
parameters. 
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